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arrangement for the joint working of the Kirin-Changchun Railway were not sufficient to ensure the loss of Kirin every demand of the Japanese has now been conceded and it is impossible to foresee what the consequences will be. As regards their demand for the opening of five places to trade, some of these places as, for instance, Liu Tao Kou and Kuang Chi Yu, although important positions are still situated within the disputed territory and the demand that they should be opened to trade might perhaps be acceded to, but Pai Ts'ao Kou, which is rich in minerals, is a most important place, and is almost 100 li north of Yen-chi and there are few Coreaus there.
Tou Tao Kou and Chi Pi Kon are important places on the route to Fongtien and are about 90 li from Yen-chi. All these places have nothing whatever to do with the boundary, and serious disadvantages will follow if they have really been opened to trade. As regards the question of judicial courts in Yen-chi, we have never hitherto, in the course of our difficulties with the Japanese, admitted in any way their right to judicial authority, and it is impossible to understand why we have now agreed to the establishment of Mixed Courts. In agreeing to the appointment of consuls we merely admit consular jurisdiction, but by consenting to the establishment of Mixed Courts we openly recognise Yen-chi to be leased territory, and this is entirely different from the opening of places of trade. Tien Pao-shan, which is famous for its silver mines, is about 50 li north of Yen-chi and has nothing to do with the boundary question. Since I have arrived in Fengtien I have done my best to preserve these mines for China, and to oppose the efforts of the Japanese, and in the case of other natural resources such as mines and forests I have during the past two years succeeded in the face of enormous difficulties in resisting the Japanese claims, pending the settlement of the boundary question. Now, however, the question of the boundary has been decided, the rights which I have striven to protect are at once surrendered. It is enough to cause one to despair.
Even if it be argued that the above concessions have some concern with Yen-chi, the construction of a line to Ying-k'ou, which can be extended west of the Liao River, and our undertaking that no parallel line shall be built west of the Liao mean that we have definitely precluded ourselves from any further development of Manchuria. When we allowed Russia to build the Chinese Eastern Railway, we lost the tunity of doing anything for Mauchuria as a whole, and although, after the oppor- reorganisation of the three provinces, we endeavoured to extend railway communica- tions, it was beyond our power to help the regions to the north-east. the construction of the Taonan-Fakumen and Chinchow-Tsitsihar Railways was For this reason planned, with a view to protecting the Mongolian frontiers and uniting the three provinces of Manchuria, but now these rights have been abandoned, and not merely have our rights in Manchuria been thrown away, but it is to be feared that it will even be impossible for us to undertake any railway constraction in Iuner or Outer Mongolia.
The consideration of all these points cannot but excite the deepest regret, and I would point out, with regard to these negotiations, that it is not a case of a conquered country suing for peace and unable to offer any resistance to the victor's demands. The first intention of the Japanese was merely to take advantage of the unsettled position of the Corean boundary question, in order to obtain some special advantages upon our frontiers, but, in face of the conclusive evidence in our favour, and in spite of all their specious arguments, they could only succeed in making some confusion by claiming that the Pu-erh-ba-t'ung and Hai-lan Rivers were parts of the Tiumen, the piece of land in dispute only measuring some 100 from north to south, and it would really be as well to surrender this land to them altogether if our rights over all the country north of Yen-chi could thereby be preserved unimpaired.
These boundary negotiations have now been proceeding for nearly two years, and have cost the State almost 1,000,000 taels, and the only result is that, in return for a nominal recovery of our territory we have opened all the important places north of Yen-chi, have lost all our rights there so that it will be impossible for us to keep anything for ourselves in the southern part of Kirin, and have agreed to borrow money from them for the construction of the Kirin-Huining Railway, whereby the power of the South Manchurian Railway will be extended throughout the two provinces of Fengtien and Kirin. The Japanese have not only supreme authority in Corea, their power is now extended as far as the capital of Kirin. We have also precluded ourselves from constructing any parallel line west of the Liao and have thereby put a stop to the gradual development of communications in Manchuria. fact, on account of a dispute about the boundaries of one piece of land, we have lost
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all our rights in Manchuria, and it would have been incomparably better to surrender the land to them at once without any attempt at negotiation,
Furthermore, the Russian military forces in the Far East have been enormously increased in recent years, munitions of war have been constantly sent out by the Siberian Railway, and they are eagerly watching for an opportunity of avenging their defeat. When they see how Japan has been able, merely through a dispute about boundaries, to secure these great concessions their resentment will naturally be extreme. Other countries too, seeing how easy it is to get the better of us, will put forward claims to equal privileges, and when I consider what difficult international questions and what terrible wars are impending I cannot but feel the utmost apprehension. I feel, however, that although the Wai-wu Pu have complete authority in international questions it is still the duty of the provincial authorities to defend their country, and as your Excellency's telegram to Na-tung proved of no avail I addressed a long telegram to the Wai-wa Pu, but the fact that I have received no reply is sufficient evidence that the Board's view is unfavourable. If I delay any longer the agreement will be signed, and then not only will our remonstrances be unavailing, but even the Imperial Power will be unable to help us. After long consideration the only course that appears open to me is to entreat your Excellency to memorialise the Throne by telegraph, setting forth all the aspects of the situation and asking that the Wai-wu Pu be instructed to lose no time in arranging some other solution which will recover some small portion of our rights.
Even if the current rumours are false, my responsibility remains the same, and in the present critical position of affairs I am quite prepared to run the risk of censure, but I am confident that your Excellency, whose patriotism is known to all, will not regard my representations as mere blind ravings. Furthermore, in view of the pressing importance of the matter, this telegram has been prepared in con- sultation with the Commissioners and Taotais, including Shih Taotai, from Harbin, who is at present here. They were unanimous in holding that the situation admitted of no delay, and unite with me in requesting your Excellency to submit a memorial by telegraph in order to save our country.
Inclosure 2 in No. 1.
Newspaper Extract.
THE MANCHURIAN CONVENTION: EXPLANATION OF THE MURDEN " SECRET
AGREEMENT.
Official Communiqué.
SINCE the consummation of the recent negotiations and the publication (by the "Peking and Tien-tsin Times") of the two agreements between China and Japan, relating to Chientao and some of the Manchurian questions, it seems as if some quarters have been exercised by some misapprehension and misgivings. There seems to be involved misunderstandings on two points in regard to the import of article 4 of the Manchurian agreement. The first is that the clause reading "in conformity with the general principles agreed to by the governor-general of the three eastern provinces and the governor of the province of Mukden with the Japanese consul- general in the 40th year of Meiji (1907), &c." is looked upon as referring to a secret agreement of some sort which had been entered into between the authorities of the two countries on some prior occasion. The second is that the above article gives to Japan exclusive rights of exploiting the mining properties along the Antung- Mukden Railway and the main line of the South Manchurian Railway, which is incompatible with the principle of the " open door and equal opportunities"; while some seem to see in it à violation of the treaty rights of other Powers. If only for the sake of laying correct information before the public a reasonable statement seems to be called for at this moment.
In the first place the negotiations between the Chinese authorities and the Japanese consul-general at Mukden in 1907 were merely a necessary and natural sequel to the Peking protocol of December 1905. As Japan succeeded, by the treaty
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